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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Huang Chen, Chief of the Liaison Office of the
People's Republic of China
Tsien Ta-yung, Political Counselor
Chi Ch'ao-chu, Interpreter

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning,
Department of State
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member,
National Security Council

DATE, TIME,
AND PLACE:

July 15, 1974, 11:45 a.m. - 12:20 p.m.
The Secretary's Office, Department of State

SUBJECT:

The Secretary's Meeting with PRC Liaison
Office Chief Huang Chen After the Moscow
Summit

As the Chinese were escorted into the Secretary's office, the Secretary commented on Ambassador Huang's summer suit.

Ambassador Huang: It's summer!

Secretary Kissinger: Fortunately, we now have a house with a swimming pool so we can endure the summer weather.

Ambassador Huang: I'm also fortunate in that my house also has a pool.

Secretary Kissinger: One of my colleagues said the other day (after the Wu Shu performance) that, one, we should avoid a quarrel with the Chinese, and, two, if we ever do get into a fight with them never engage in hand-to-hand combat.

Ambassador Huang: Yes, I saw that remark quoted in the papers.

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2

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Secretary Kissinger: The little girl in the Wu Shu troupe was just adorable. Everyone was good.

I think you know that I sent a message to Prime Minister Chou through Ambassador Bruce saying that I hope he gets well soon.

Ambassador Huang: The Premier has received your letter of concern. He has asked me to express to you his thanks. He is now convalescing in the hospital. When the Premier met Senator Jackson he told the Senator that he had been invited to China at the recommendation of the President and Secretary of State. The Premier sent his personal greetings to you and the President [via Senator Jackson].

Secretary Kissinger: I think it was a good move [that you invited the Senator to China].

Ambassador Huang: It was on your recommendation.

Secretary Kissinger: Even though the Senator is critical of me, I think it is a good thing to have had him in China.

Ambassador Huang: As far as I know, you are a good friend of the Senator's.

Secretary Kissinger: I am on good personal terms with him. I will see him later this week. He is running for President [which is why he is critical of me in public]. One good way to get your name into the paper is to raise my name.

Ambassador Huang: Has the Senator decided to run for President?

Secretary Kissinger: Not formally. But seriously, he is a friend of mine. On general policy direction I agree with him. Sometimes his tactics are rather crude, however. He lacks a certain measure of subtlety. In terms of objectives I agree with him. I don't disagree with his orientation to the Soviets. I just approach them in a more complicated way -- but to achieve the same objectives. On that issue we're in complete agreement. His tactics are more those of frontal attack; mine are more complicated.

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3

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In Moscow, Gromyko said that they had finally discovered my policy to be more complicated than they had at first thought. Now they will have to consider how to deal with this situation. I don't think they have solved this one.

Ambassador Huang: You have dealt with them for some time, so you understand them.

Secretary Kissinger: I know them well.

I wanted to talk to you about the Summit meeting, and one or two other matters:

At the Summit there couldn't have been any surprises for you, at least in the published documents.

Ambassador Huang: You told us your estimate [of the projected results] when we met before you left.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes; it came out exactly as I told --ou. I'll be glad to comment on any aspect of the situation -- but it went just as I told you.

One thing that did come up was their attempt on a number of occasions to involve us in documents or agreements which had an escape clause regarding China. They made one proposal to us which was for a treaty of friendship and cooperation to go to each other's assistance if either was attacked by a third party. This we will certainly refuse. You are the only other government we have mentioned this to -- except for Britain.

Ambassador Huang: Was it a treaty of "cooperation," or "mutual assistance?"

Secretary Kissinger: The former. The key issue was to come to the aid of the other if one was attacked by a third party. They gave us no text, however. The way it came up was that Brezhnev mentioned it to the President when I wasn't there -- he didn't dare raise it while I was present. Then Brezhnev afterwards mentioned it to me; he said he had discussed it with the President. I said I could not see such a situation arising. I made a joke. I told them about the Treaty of Björkö. The Czar and the German Emperor signed a treaty between themselves, but it lasted only for one day. We will not negotiate [with the Soviets] on this subject.

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4

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Ambassador Huang: We really don't have any worries on this. [Mr. Chi incorrectly translates the Ambassador's phrase as "worries." It is more accurately rendered as "we don't care about this."]

Secretary Kissinger: If Japan attacks you, then both we and the Soviet Union will help you. [Laughter]

I mentioned this to you so that they won't raise mischief with it. But we will not negotiate on this issue.

Ambassador Huang: For us it's not a question of worrying. We don't care about such things. [Mr. Chi comments on his inaccurate translation.]

Secretary Kissinger: This is a question of mentality, and that is significant. On many levels [such a treaty] is a stupid thing to offer. If we signed such an agreement, none of our European allies would trust us -- this is not just a question of China. So it is significant from that point of view. But at any rate, we won't proceed with it.

As for the rest, now that the SALT discussions are in a longer time frame, we plan to begin discussions in Geneva about September 1. Then sometime in October I may go to Moscow again. But the only reason I might go would be to discuss SALT. But the timing depends on the Geneva discussions. It also depends on how long your delegate to the United Nations [Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua] is in New York. I don't dare leave the U.S. while your delegate is at the U.N.

Ambassador Huang: You are old friends. There is no need to worry. [Laughter]

Secretary Kissinger: This is our present plan. There are also some basic figures I want to give you, so that you can give them to Peking.

Ambassador Huang: I remember that you discussed these figures with Vice Premier Teng in New York.

Secretary Kissinger: [The strategic balance is] four and a half to one, four to one in our favor.

Ambassador Huang: I remember your comments to the Vice Premier: 3.5 to 1 in strategic forces; if you add the B-52s it's 4.5; if you add your carriers it's 5.5.

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5

Secretary Kissinger: When the Trident submarine system comes in, it will shift the balance even further in our direction. The Soviets have not yet deployed one single multiple warhead. They are still testing this system. One type has been a complete failure. Another type is nearly completed, but it is only like our early model. They have a perfect record on their [MIRVs for] big missiles: all failures.

(Ambassador Huang interjects: They are trying to surpass you.) There is no possibility of that. After ten years, after 1978, when the Trident, the B-1 bomber are produced, the curves will separate even farther.

Ambassador Huang: The Russians still have the mentality of wanting to surpass you.

Secretary Kissinger: But their technology is not as good as ours.

Ambassador Huang: Of late we have been reading press reports by the former Chief of the Joint Chiefs, and by Mr. Nitze, criticizing you.

Secretary Kissinger: Zumwalt. When I read them I get scared myself! We don't have the practice in our country of sending our military leaders off to the provinces. [Laughter] This is just nonsense. Every time we get in a difficult situation [Mr. Chi translates this as "crisis situation"] we put our navy forward and dare them to take us on. But each time they do not dare to do so.

Ambassador Huang: That is a good thing.

Secretary Kissinger: These [press] statements are really nonsense. They count the number of ships, but don't count the relative fire power on them. So I would pay no attention to them. We certainly didn't act as if we were scared last year in the Middle East crisis. [Ambassador Huang interjects: I understand.] We will continue to act exactly the same way.

About the return of Ambassador Bruce: He is a good friend of mine. I like to get his advice on the general international situation. His return is not related to U. S. - PRC relations.

Ambassador Huang: This is quite a normal situation -- for a vacation, for discussions. I just told Mr. Lord that our Deputy Chief, Han Hsu, is going back in a few days. [Secretary Kissinger interjects: You

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6

haven't been back in awhile.] But as you said, Ambassador Bruce can come back twice. I haven't been back once this year.

Secretary Kissinger: You were giving me a complex. Each time I saw you [last year] you would tell me you were going back. [Laughter]

Other Matters: Last time I mentioned Korea. In Indochina, we want to keep the situation as quiet as possible. In Laos, with the Premier sick we want to keep things peaceful, we hope we can avoid instability.

Ambassador Huang: Regarding Korea, we have received no reply as yet. Concerning Laos, we also were happy about the establishment of the coalition government. We hope it can continue. I also understand that Prince Souvanna is ill, but I hear from the Laotian Ambassador here that he is improving. I was a friend of the Ambassador in Paris. His [Souvanna's] illness came on suddenly. He [the Laotian Ambassador] is coming to my residence soon. [At this point Ambassador Huang makes a move to depart.]

Mr. Chi [to the Secretary]: The Ambassador looks forward to meeting you at his residence [when he holds his party for you].

Secretary Kissinger: We will give you another date -- after August 1 -- as the first date was inconvenient.

Ambassador Huang: Mrs. Kissinger should bring her friends.

[On this note, the meeting concluded.]

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